Every US presidential election is consequential but American voters face an unusually weighty decision in 2024. The outcome will have implications for foreign policy, social policy, and the integrity of the political system. But none of its consequences will be more profound or far-reaching than on global efforts to combat the climate crisis.
As president, Donald Trump pulled the US out of the Paris climate agreement, while the US under Joe Biden rejoined it. Trump has promised to expand oil and gas production, and his campaign has said he will again withdraw the US from the Paris accord if he wins a second term.
By contrast, Kamala Harris, the Democratic nominee, supported the Green New Deal, an ambitious congressional plan for tackling the climate crisis, while serving in the Senate in 2019. As California’s attorney general, she investigated the oil industry, securing a settlement from a subsidiary of BP for underground gas tank ruptures, as well as indictments against a Texas-based pipeline operator for an environmentally damaging oil leak.
Clearly, the positions of the two candidates on the climate crisis could not be more different.
But one might ask: what is so catastrophic about a newly re-elected Trump pulling the US out of the Paris accord a second time, if the next president could, like Biden, simply rejoin it?
In fact, Trump’s advisers are aware of the possibility. They are reportedly drafting executive orders that would remove the US not just from the Paris climate agreement but also from the UN framework convention on climate change, the foundation on which the Paris agreement is built.
Reversing that step would then require approval by the US Senate. And Senate approval cannot be taken for granted, given the ample representation in that chamber of oil- and gas-rich states.
Moreover, a Trump presidency would put other bilateral climate agreements, actual and potential, at risk. Currently, a prospective US-EU climate deal, intended to reconcile the respective economies’ different approaches to reining in greenhouse gas emissions, is in suspended animation, owing to the approach of the US election.
The EU has combined its cap-and-trade permit system with a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) – in effect, a tax on the carbon content equivalent of imports from countries failing to put an adequate price on emissions. A carbon price being a nonstarter in the US Congress, the Biden administration has instead proceeded with subsidies for low-carbon production of steel, aluminium and other products.
Trump is unlikely to persist with climate-friendly subsidies, much less with negotiations. The EU would then apply its CBAM to US exports in full. Inevitably, US retaliation would result.
Late last year, the US and China successfully negotiated the Sunnylands statement affirming their commitment to work together to combat climate change. This commitment by the world’s two largest economies to limit emissions was predicated, in each country’s case, on the willingness of the other to do likewise.
Significantly, China agreed for the first time to add non-carbon greenhouse gases – including methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons used in the manufacture of air conditioners – to its prior agreements.
Trump, of course, has famously insisted that China “cheats” its international partners. If the US reneged on its climate commitments, China would have every incentive to do likewise. And Trump’s proposed 60% tariff on all imports from China would be another nail in Sunnylands’ coffin.
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Harris, on the other hand, would seek to reinvigorate these negotiations, at least if her support for the Green New Deal is any guide. But she could also do more. She could demonstrate her independence from her predecessor by removing Biden’s punishing tariffs on imports of Chinese electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and solar panels (which also cover solar equipment produced by Chinese companies in Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam).
Various rationales are offered for these tariffs. They secure domestic supply chains. They offset unfair Chinese subsidies and dumping. They give US factories time to move down their production learning curves and cut costs in key industries that would otherwise be dominated by a strategic rival. They hold out hope of creating additional manufacturing jobs.
These are worthy goals. But they come at the cost of impeding climate crisis adaptation and abatement of emissions. Shutting out economical Chinese EVs encourages US motorists to stick with internal combustion engines. Taxing Chinese solar panels discourages US households from installing lightweight plug-in panels on their balconies, as Germans do.
Thus, President Harris would face a dilemma. She would have to decide whether to prioritise domestic manufacturing jobs and economic independence from China over the fight against the climate crisis. There is no avoiding the trade-off. But, then, this is the type of question that presidents are elected to decide.